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Abstract 
Successful performance – be it in school, at the job, or in sports activities – requires 
perseverance, i.e., persistent work on a demanding task. We investigate in a controlled 
laboratory experiment how an individual’s social environment affects perseverance. 
We find evidence for two kinds of peer effects: being observed by a peer can serve as 
a commitment device, while observing a peer can be informative. In particular, we 
show that successful peers affect perseverance positively if they communicate their 
success in a motivating way and negatively otherwise, while perseverance is 
unaffected by unsuccessful peers. Our experimental results suggest that peers affect 
perseverance indirectly, via influencing self-confidence. We turn to field data from an 
educational setting and find that students seem to be able to harness the power of peer 
effects, by selecting into groups that help them reach their goals. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Motivation 
Some people are more successful than others. Be it in school, at the job, or in sports activities, 
there are tasks which require painful effort at some point. While many people let themselves 
get distracted or fully give up, others stay focused and keep working on the successful 
completion, i.e. they persevere. Clearly, perseverance is to some extent a matter of personality. 
However, individual behavior is also shaped by the social environment, which includes peers, 
teachers, parents, and coaches. Personal interactions can have two very distinct effects on 
individual perseverance.   
On the one hand, others who know about the task at hand and interact with the individual after 
the task can induce social pressure. This is the typical view that peer effects work through being 
observed by peers. On the other hand, observing peers before the own task can affect an 
individual’s ability to persevere. More experienced peers, as well as mentors and coaches, may 
foreshadow the value of perseverance and affect the confidence of the one aspiring to 
successfully complete a task.1 It is important to understand the conditions for positive and 
negative peer effects on perseverance because they can have severe consequences. Applications 
range from students’ educational success, over performance of sports athletes, to success within 
organizations.  
In this paper, we test both categories of peer effects on perseverance in a controlled laboratory 
experiment and we illustrate the importance of peers for self-control – which is necessary for 
perseverance – in a field study. We find that both types of peer effects are present in some way. 
Peer pressure to justify the own performance after the task induces participants to try for a 
longer period before giving up. Communication with a successful peer before the task, on the 
other hand, can either induce participants to give up immediately or to persevere, depending on 
the content of the communication. This last result means that a successful peer can have a 
crucial effect on the perseverance of a less experienced individual, while unsuccessful peers are 
rather ignored, according to our data.  
                                                 
1 As an illustration of the two categories of peer effects, we may consider a leisure time runner who aspires to 
complete a marathon. Joining a group of runners might have a positive effect for the ability to persevere for 
multiple reasons. Committing to regularly practicing together and having announced the own plan to participate 
in a certain marathon to the group clearly fall into the category of peer effects through peer pressure. Learning 
about the challenges that running a marathon implies and increasing the own self-confidence by observing that 
others have succeeded to finish a marathon clearly falls into to the category of peer effects through learning. Yet, 
to choose a group of runners, it is important to know which effect is at work, under which conditions they are 
working, and when there are actually negative peer effects.   
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We provide one of the first experimental studies on how peers influence individual 
perseverance by their own success or failure.2  We find that the effect depends on the way peers 
communicate about the difficulty of the task. In the field study, we illustrate the relation 
between own self-control and the social network one maintains in an economically relevant 
environment.  
1.2 Two Categories of Peer Effects 
Perseverance, which is required to successfully complete a demanding task, necessitates self-
control, i.e. the strength to resist temptations to procrastinate. For instance, a student might want 
to study hard in the evening, in order to be well prepared for class the next day and to eventually 
perform better in the exam by the end of the semester. However, when evening actually arrives, 
the now immediate psychological costs from studying become much more salient than the still 
relatively far-away benefits, and the student is severely tempted to go out instead. More 
generally, if a disproportionally high weight is attached to whatever costs or benefits would 
accrue immediately, then plans implying that investments precede benefits will be likely to fail 
due to the temptation to avoid immediate costs. Since performance plans typically are of this 
kind, a present bias can impede perseverance and hence performance. This link is studied in the 
literature on present-biased preferences.3  
The vast majority of the studies on peer effects suggest that being observed by peers can 
enhance performance, e.g. due to peer pressure.4 In contexts of perseverance this means that 
peers could serve as a commitment device: By imposing some social cost on a person whom 
they observe giving in to a temptation, they can help that person not to give in. An example for 
such a strategy in the educational context is a group of students who agree to meet at 8 am at 
the library and who would not appreciate any breach of this agreement. Their agreement is a 
commitment to start early with studying on that day. Considering peers as commitment devices 
is an interesting variation of the general idea that commitment devices can help overcome self-
control problems.5  
                                                 
2 The only other study we are aware of is the one by Gerhards and Gravert (2017).  
3 For theoretical contributions see, e.g., Strotz (1955), Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Ainslie and Haslam (1992), 
Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Bénabou and Pycia (2002), and 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006). Recent experimental contributions on time preferences include Ariely and 
Wertenbroch (2002), Andersen et al. (2008), Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter (2008) and Andreoni and Sprenger 
(2012). 
4 See, e.g. Hoxby (2000), Hoxby and Weingarth (2005), Zimmerman (2003), Falk and Ichino (2006), Mas and 
Moretti (2009), and Calvo-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2009). The latter combines theory and empirics to 
investigate peer effects in an educational setting.  
5 See Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002), Houser et al. (2010), and Burger et al. (2011). 
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The second category of peer effects on perseverance is elaborated in the theory of Battaglini, 
Bénabou and Tirole (2005), hereafter: BBT, which provides us with our main hypotheses. They 
stipulate that observing one’s peers - rather than being observed by them - can affect own 
performance. The reason is that the behavior of others can be informative about how much the 
task at hand would challenge one’s own self-control.  
In BBT, self-control is the ability to persevere on a task (that may be anything from not drinking 
alcohol to preparing for an exam or working on a paper). Individuals have imperfect knowledge 
about their own self-control, but know that levels of self-control are positively correlated within 
their peer group. Hence, observing how peers react to temptations provides individuals with 
additional information about their own level of self-control. This, in turn, affects their self-
confidence and consequently the degree to which they themselves exhibit self-controlled 
behavior in the future.6  Intuitively, observing how peers can handle similar challenges to their 
willpower can be encouraging or discouraging (“if he can do it, then so can I” or “if not even 
he can do it, then I do not even have to try”). Hence, the theory of BBT is complementary to 
the vast majority of the literature on peer effects which assumes that being observed by – rather 
than observing – one’s peers affects own performance. 
1.3 Our Contribution 
In a large lab experiment with overlapping generations, we address the question whether 
observing or being observed affects own perseverance and performance. Hence, we test the 
major claims that BBT and the empirical literature on peer effects make about causality against 
each other. For this purpose, we match subjects who face a challenge to perseverance with 
subjects who faced the same challenge before and whose success or failure is observed by the 
former. We let the matched pairs talk to each other in bilateral free text chats about the 
challenge. Some of the subjects who chat after the task anticipate being observed by and 
chatting with the peer, and some do not. The former setting is the commitment treatment in 
which being observed  by peers may function as commitment device. Subjects who chat before 
the task can be encouraged or discouraged to persevere later on by observing an experienced 
peer. We find that knowing in advance that one has to justify one’s own performance toward 
one’s peers prevents giving up immediately but does not necessarily have long-lasting effects 
on perseverance. Hence, there seems to be a commitment effect as stipulated by the empirical 
literature on peer effects. However, we also find effects on those unpracticed peers who observe 
                                                 
6 Relatedly, Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2003) and Mechtenberg (2009) theoretically study effects of 
communication on self-confidence of subjects with incomplete self-knowledge. These studies find both positive 
and negative effects on self-confidence, i.e. learning from a peer can be both encouraging and discouraging.   
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how their advanced peers explain their own success. More specifically, both motivating and de-
motivating messages from the advanced peer affect own perseverance if and only if the peer 
had been successful in her own task. A peer’s success or failure in itself, unmediated by 
communication, has no effect on perseverance.  
In our lab experiment, communication is the channel through which information that is assumed 
to be public in BBT is made available. Communication addresses in particular information on 
how, according to the experienced peer’s belief, the subjective difficulty of the task at hand – 
or, alternatively, the individual level of self-control – is distributed in the population. Hence, 
our lab experiment combines the approach of BBT with a communication channel similar to 
the one discussed in Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2003) and Mechtenberg (2009). The presence 
of communication channels is also the main feature of our experimental design that essentially 
distinguishes our lab experiment from the one conducted by Gerhards and Gravert (2017). As 
opposed to them, we do not find that observing one’s peers – without the mediation of 
communication – has any effect on perseverance; in our lab experiment, it is the interaction 
between listening to communication and observing success that is effective. 
While we implement exogenous bilateral relationships of students in the lab to identify 
directions of causality in peer effects on perseverance, it is an endogenous social network of 
students that we investigate in our field study. The move to an endogenous network is the 
logical next step in our analysis since in reality, the total net peer effects on perseverance and 
the resulting performance depend on whether subjects connect to those peers who have positive 
rather than negative effects on their perseverance. BBT assume such rationality, but real 
network formation decisions might look different. First, other motives, like homophily on 
observable characteristics, play a role (Currarini et. al., 2009) and, second, it is realistic to 
assume that there is also a stochastic element in who connects with whom (Jackson and Rogers, 
2007) . Whether subjects form helpful rather than harmful social networks in the presence of a 
task that challenges their self-control is an empirical question.  
In our field study, we behaviorally elicit individual self-control, talent, and performance; and 
we reconstruct the social network of our students with survey methods.7 We show that more 
self-controlled students are better connected to their peers, have better access to highly talented 
peers and write better exam grades than students with low self-control.  Our findings are 
consistent with BBT and the empirical test of their theory in Battaglini, Diaz, and Patacchini 
                                                 
7 Communication is less salient in our field study, but is indirectly present there, too, since we elicit real-world 
networks of students that obviously include communication channels. In our field study, we measure individual 
time-consistency rather than perseverance to elicit self-control.  
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(2015). In particular, we find evidence for their prediction that individuals with low self-control 
rationally remain unconnected to their peers while individuals with sufficiently high self-
control connect to them. In addition, we find that connectedness and performance are positively 
correlated, which is in line with both the theory and the empirical results of Calvó-Armengol, 
Patacchini and Zenou (2009). Specifically, we find that it is connectedness to talented friends 
that correlates with performance. We conclude that students seem to be able to harness the 
power of peer effects, by selecting into groups that help them reach their goals. 
To our knowledge, we are the first to combine within one field study the  behavioral 
measurement of self-control with the measurement of subjects’ social network. Moreover, we 
are the first to combine a lab experiment with a field study to investigate peer effects on 
perseverance. 
 
2 Lab Experiment 
We first introduce the experimental design and implementation. Then we turn to the results.  
2.1 Experimental Design 
We first describe the task environment and then the overlapping-generations structure and the 
different treatments. 
THE TASK ENVIRONMENT To measure perseverance, we implemented the combination 
of a real-effort task with access to the internet (see, e.g., Corgnet et al. 2015). In order to create 
the necessary variation in perseverance, we chose a real-effort task that is (1) depleting, to 
require an effort to persevere, (2) meaningless, to reduce average intrinsic motivation, and (3) 
novel to our subject pool, to exclude experience from previous real-effort experiments. Subjects 
had to identify, among a number of meaningless strings of letters (like abCOCAcaZAgbCBZ) 
any such strings that contain the letter combination “abc” (in all combinations of small and 
capital letters) if that is followed by a vowel. (For such tasks and their depleting effect, see 
Baumeister et al., 1998, and many others as surveyed in Hagger, Wood, & Stiff, 2010.)  
The task was divided into ten subtasks, each consisting of 99 strings displayed on the computer 
screen, with five input fields for the five strings that had to be identified. A subtask was counted 
as correctly solved if at least four of the five strings were identified correctly. The entire task 
was counted as correctly solved if five out of the ten subtasks were solved. We chose these 
standards (after piloting the real-effort task) to allow approximately one third of our subjects to 
solve the entire task correctly. For the correctly solved task, a bonus of 100 points was paid. 
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Additional points were paid for each subtask that was correctly solved. The difficulty of the 
task was increasing in that more and more letters a, b, and c appeared in the strings, while still 
only five strings had to be identified. The points awarded for correct subtasks were fixed to 20. 
Subjects had 50 minutes to solve the task, but they could also give up on it whenever they 
wished. Those who wished to give up could click the terminate-task button always visible on 
the task screen and spend the remainder of their time browsing the internet. 
Browsing the internet is a common diversion at the work-place and hence a realistic obstacle to 
perseverance. However, it is to be expected that the laboratory setting activates the social norm 
to exclusively concentrate on the experimental task. Moreover, access to the internet is typically 
blocked in lab experiments to enhance control. Therefore, granting access to the internet may 
well create a demand effect; subjects might deduce from the design that browsing the internet 
would be encoded as lack of perseverance. Thus, simply granting access to the internet might 
not be sufficient to induce any usage of it. To prevent the demand effect and to overcome the 
social norm of “no surfing in the lab”, we paid a small bonus of 20 points for terminating the 
real-effort task and paid “surfing points” for browsing the internet afterwards, thereby providing 
a possible rationale for giving up the task. Browsing the internet in minute t yielded t/10 points 
to someone who terminated the task. For instance, if a subject clicked the “terminate-task” 
button in minute 12, she earned 1.2 points in minute 12; 1.3 points in minute 13, and so on. 
Hence, who only browsed the internet and did not even start working on the task received 125 
points in total. Generally, clicking the “terminate task” button at time T yielded 125 − 1
20
𝑇𝑇2  
points in total. 100 points correspond to 5 Euros. The payoff structure of the task environment 
is depicted in Figure 1. The respective amount of points possible to gain for continuing the task 
and for terminating it and surfing for the rest of the time was continuously announced on the 
experimental screen in z-tree.  
Figure 1: Overview of Payoff Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
≥ 5 
< 5 
Free Browsing Points For Every Minute 0 - 125 Points 20 Points 
***TERMINATE TASK*** 
100 Point Bonus 
No Bonus 20 Points For Each Puzzle Solved; 
Unpaid Breaks 
Solve Puzzles 
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The payoff structure is such that the following holds in virtually any case: If one solves at least 
five of the ten subtasks correctly, i.e., if one is eligible for the task bonus, then it pays off to 
continue on the task until the end, that is, to never click the “terminate task” button. If one 
solves less than five of the ten puzzles correctly, then it pays off to quit the task, that is, to click 
the “terminate task” button. In this case, the best choice is to terminate right after the beginning 
of the task. We did not communicate during the task whether the subject had reached the 
threshold for the bonus (this would strongly determine performance). Also, we took great care 
to explain the payoff structure and the choice between continuing and terminating the task in 
the instructions, using Figure 1. Subjects were given an example of a subtask in the instructions 
for them to assess their own confidence in their performance. Also, in the course of their work 
at the task we elicited their beliefs about whether or not they solved the last subtask correctly. 
Hence, we could validate that their termination decision was optimal, given their beliefs, which 
is true for more than 90% of the participants. (More precisely, of those who believed that they 
had solved five subtasks or more correctly, no one gave up. Of the remaining participants, most 
(84%) gave up at some point.)  
To familiarize subjects with the website that they could browse after task termination, we 
explicitly stated in the instructions that taking occasional breaks from the task and surfing 
during the breaks are allowed. However, we did not pay any points for browsing the internet 
during a break. Breaks could be scheduled freely by clicking the break button and switching to 
a specific website created by us for a deliberate amount of time.8 Moreover, prior to each 
subtask, subjects had to go on a website to search a password with which they could unlock the 
next subtask in z-tree. The website offered a broad variety of pictures and articles in many 
categories such as politics, sports, diets, celebrities, cartoons, and news; and during the 
unlocking of each subtask, subjects were made aware of the possible diversions offered on the 
website.  
TREATMENTS We conducted four different treatments in a between-subjects design, two 
newcomer treatments and two leader treatments. We now use the “leader” and “newcomer” 
terminology to easily refer to a more experienced peer versus an unexperienced peer. Subjects 
were invited in subsequent cohorts, with a leader cohort preceding a newcomer cohort; a cohort 
comprised twelve subjects, half as many as were cubicles in the lab. All treatments had two 
parts, a task part and a chat part. The task part was spent in the task environment as described 
above. In the chat part, subjects in a newcomer treatment were randomly matched one-to-one 
                                                 
8 Note that breaks need not signify lack of perseverance but might be part of an optimal working schedule since 
the task is depleting.  
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with the subjects of the preceding leader treatment and could chat with their matched partner 
for three minutes. The treatment structure is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Treatments. Committed leaders (CL), newcomers with committed leaders (NewCL), uncommitted 
leaders (UCL), and newcomers with uncommitted leaders (NewUCL) 
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part of a newcomer treatment learned the failure or success and the degree of perseverance of 
their matched partner, i.e., whether or not their matched partner had earned the bonus of 100 
points and whether or not she had terminated the task. This was communicated to the 
newcomers on their computer screen and remained visible there throughout the next (task) part. 
In addition, newcomers could communicate with the matched leader via a chat window during 
the chat part. The chat opportunity lasted for three minutes.  Chat format was free text; there 
were no prohibitions, except that anonymity must be kept. We asked the leaders from the 
preceding cohort to address the following three questions: 1) Please estimate the fraction of 
participants in percent that manage the task, i.e. who reached the bonus of 100 points. 2) Does 
it pay off to strive for the bonus or should the task be quit immediately? 3) Please, explain your 
recommendation.  Question 1, in particular, was asked to measure the similarity that a leader 
assumed between herself and the average person, regarding performance on the task. A 
successful (unsuccessful) leader who believes more than half of the other subjects to be 
successful (unsuccessful) as well deems herself rather similar to the average person; a 
successful (unsuccessful) leader who believes that no other is successful (unsuccessful) as well 
deems herself exceptional. We assume that a newcomer – who has no experience with the task 
– tends to perceive herself as an average person with regard to the task environment. Thus, the 
answer that her matched leader gives to question 1 provides her with information about how 
similar she herself is to her matched leader. Since BBT implies that only similar peers have 
effects on subjects’ perseverance, we expect the answers given by the leaders to question 1 to 
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set the conditions for any effects of their success or failure on the perseverance of the matched 
newcomers. 
Leader treatments In the commitment treatment “committed leaders” (short: CL) subjects are 
leaders: They first do the task part and then the chat part. During the task part they know the 
content of the second part, i.e., that they will be matched with newcomers (after carrying out 
the task), that these newcomers will learn their success or failure and their perseverance, and 
that they will chat for three minutes. By contrast, in the other leader treatment “uncommitted 
leaders” (short: UCL)  they do not anticipate the details of the chat part since instructions for 
that are only given after completion of the task part. Hence, subjects do not anticipate that they 
will be matched with newcomers of the subsequent cohort and that information about their own 
perseverance and performance will be provided to their matched partners. 
Newcomer treatments In the “newcomers with committed leaders” treatment (short: NewCL) 
subjects are newcomers: They first do the chat part and then the task part. They are matched 
with leaders from CL (committed leaders) in the chat part.  In the other newcomer treatment 
“newcomers with uncommitted leaders” (short: NewUCL) subjects are matched with leaders 
from UCL (uncommitted leaders) during the chat part. 
IMPLEMENTATION In total, we have N=336 participants which amounts to 84 subjects 
(i.e., observations) per treatment. Despite the logistic complexities of this overlapping 
generations experiment and the IT reliability challenge to let participants seamlessly switch 
between experimental software and a web browser, there was only one case of a system failure 
within a regular session.9 Cohorts are overlapping: always two consecutive cohorts were 
chatting with each other after the first of the two had finished the task and before the second 
started with it. Hence, for logistic reasons we conducted multiple sequences of sessions per day. 
We distributed these sequences of sessions across different days and made sure that treatments 
do not differ much in the days and time slots at which they were run. The experiment was run 
at the WISO-laboratory of Hamburg University. A different room outside the computer lab was 
reserved for reading of instructions and a subsequent quiz to guarantee understanding of the 
decision and payoff structure. Another room outside the lab was reserved for payment (in cash 
and in private). Communication other than required in the chat part of the experiment was 
prohibited. In the time span between the end of the task and leaving (in treatments NewCL and 
NewUCL) or chatting with the subsequent cohort (in treatments CL and UCL), subjects 
answered a questionnaire. This questionnaire elicited age and sex of the subject and other 
control variables. The chat data were transcribed and coded by a research assistant unaware of 
                                                 
9 This reduces the number of observations in NewCL to 83. 
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the purpose of the study and the different treatments. The reliability of the coding was checked 
and confirmed by having another, equally unaware research assistant, coding the same chat 
protocols. The coding of the three questions that had to be addressed in the chat into answer 
categories was straight-forward.  
2.2 Results 
Before we turn to the effects of observing peers and to the effects of being observed by peers, 
we first provide some summary statistics for the main variables.  
2.2.1 Some Summary Statistics 
The main outcome variables are the number of subtasks solved correctly (Puzzles) and the 
dummy whether the bonus is reached or not (Bonus).  
Table 1 reports summary statistics of these main outcome variables and also reports the payoff 
earned in EUR (Payoff) and the minutes participants stayed in the task before clicking the 
“terminate task” button (MinutesTask). The average number of correctly solved puzzles is 
below four, but still roughly every third participant (34%) reached the bonus of 100 points, 
which requires to solve five or more. There was indeed one person who solved 10 puzzles 
correctly, each time believed that the puzzle is solved correctly, and received the bonus of 100 
points. (This leads to the maximal number of points of 10*20 + 10*1 + 100 =310, which yields 
the maximal payoff of EUR 15.50 + 8.00 = 23.50.) The average Payoff was around 16 EUR.  
In Table 1 there are separate outcome statistics for those participants who gave up, i.e. clicked 
the “terminate task” button at some point, and those who stayed in the task, reported in the last 
two columns. Separating these two groups, we observe that the bonus was reached by 73% of 
those who stayed in the task. The histogram below shows that those who stayed in the task 
solved typically five or six puzzles correctly. Very few managed to solve nine or ten tasks. Most 
of those who gave up solved none or less than three tasks. Table 2 reports the timing of giving 
up, i.e. the minutes before clicking the “terminate task” button, separated by the number of 
puzzles solved. Those who solved three or four puzzles gave up after 44 of 50 minutes, which 
indicates that they strived for the bonus until they realized that they would not reach it. 
Participants who solved two puzzles or less gave up earlier.  
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Figure 3: Histogram of Puzzles by Giving Up Decision 
 
 
Since each participant was asked after each subtask whether she believed that she had solved it 
correctly, we can analyze the participants’ beliefs about the number of tasks they had solved 
correctly. The correlation of this belief with the actual amount solved correctly (Puzzles) is 
0.88. Looking at the difference between these two variables, it turns out that a majority of 
participants, 72%, has exactly accurate beliefs, while 24% overestimate the amount, and 4% 
underestimate it. Hence, beliefs are quite accurate, but there is bias consistent with 
overconfidence. The bias is however weak since most overconfident participants overestimate 
the amount solved by one or two.   
We now first analyze the effects of observing peers and communication, i.e., we focus on the 
newcomer treatments. Afterwards, we turn to the effects of being observed, i.e., we focus on 
the commitment treatment. 
2.2.2 Effects of Observing Peers and Communication  
Consider the newcomer treatments, NewCL and NewUCL. From the perspective of the 
newcomers, no treatment variable changes between these two treatments. Hence, when 
analyzing the newcomers’ reaction to what they observe from their matched leaders, we pool 
the data from NewCL and NewUCL. 
The main aspect observed by a newcomer is whether her matched leader did or did not receive 
a bonus (captured by the dummy variable BonusPeer). This piece of information is highlighted 
during the chat and on each subtask in the newcomer treatments. Moreover, in the chat the 
leaders are asked to provide a guess about the fraction of participants that was able to receive 
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the bonus. The answers range from 0% to 100%, and we call this continuous variable 
FractionSuccess. As the histograms in Figure 4 show, leaders who do not receive the bonus 
more often guess that the number of participants receiving the bonus is small, but there is still 
a considerable variation across leaders such that our subjects in the newcomer treatments get 
very different signals about the difficulty of the task and their personal likelihood of being able 
to receive the bonus. 
Figure 4: Histogram of FractionSuccess, i.e. the leader’s estimate concerning how many participants manage to 
reach the bonus, differentiated by whether the leader has received the bonus herself (right panel) or not (left 
panel)  
 
FractionSuccess provides information on the leader’s belief about how likely it is that the 
newcomer can succeed. Combined with the leader’s success or failure, FractionSuccess 
provides information on the peer’s belief on how similar she is to general population and hence 
to the newcomer. If it follows from FractionSuccess that most will succeed or fail like the peer, 
this signals high similarity. Moreover, in the chat leaders gave explicit recommendations 
whether to give up or to strive for the bonus, and we elicited how difficult the task is described 
as. These two variables Recommendation and Difficulty are highly correlated with the variable 
FractionSuccess, but coarser measures since they are binary, respectively ordinal.  
In the following we regress the main outcome variables (Puzzles and Bonus) on BonusPeer and 
FractionSuccess, which are the two most important variables of observing and communicating 
with a peer. They cover the objective information provided by the experimenter that the peer 
(leader) has or has not received the bonus, as well as the subjective message of how hard it is 
to reach the bonus. Since it must be expected that these two variables interact with each other, 
we also include the interaction term. The outcome variable Puzzles is a count variable which 
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we estimate by a Poisson regression. The outcome variable Bonus is a binary variable, for which 
we use a logistic regression.  
We first illustrate the results by plotting the predicted outcome values by different levels of 
FractionSuccess for both subjects with matched leaders who received a bonus and subjects with 
matched leaders who did not. We obtain the predicted number of puzzles and the predicted 
probability of a bonus for values of FractionSuccess that range from 0 to 100 with increments 
of 5. 
Figure 5: Marginsplots of Puzzles and Bonus by FractionSuccess and BonusPeer  
 
Figure 5 shows how the outcome variables are increasing in FractionSuccess for a matched 
leader who received a bonus and rather decreasing in FractionSuccess for a matched leader 
who did not. The graphs indicate that the best performance is predicted for those who observe 
that their matched leader obtained the bonus and who receive the message that a very high 
fraction were able to reach the bonus. Lowest performance is obtained if the matched leader 
received a bonus but reports that only very few are able to do so. It seems that a message from 
a peer who has been successful can be both particularly encouraging and particularly 
discouraging.  
To investigate this interaction effect and to test for significance of the difference between 
having a peer with bonus and a peer without bonus, we run a sequence of regressions each time 
modifying the variable FractionSuccess by subtracting a constant from it. More precisely, we 
generate the variables FractionSuccess0, FractionSuccess10, FractionSuccess20, …, 
FractionSuccess100, with FractionSuccessk defined as FractionSuccess minus k. The results 
of these regressions are all identical apart from the coefficient of BonusPeer. Consider the 
interaction term, which is the product of the binary variable BonusPeer and the continuous 
variable FractionSuccessk. When the variable FractionSuccessk is zero, the interaction term is 
always zero such that the coefficient of BonusPeer picks up the whole effect. We use this fact 
to provide an interpretation for the effects. All coefficients of BonusPeer, which are the only 
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coefficients that differ from the ones in Table 3, are reported in Table 4. Hence, the entries in 
FS0 of Table 4 correspond to the columns (1’), (2’), and (3) of Table 3.  
First, we observe that significance levels are very similar across model specifications. Thus, the 
results seem to be robust. Second, the coefficients are significant for low values and for high 
values of FractionSuccess but not in between. Moreover, the sign of the effects changes from 
low to high values. We provide an interpretation for each outcome variable, starting with 
Puzzles.  
EFFECTS ON PUZZLES Pure coefficients of the Poisson model cannot be interpreted easily 
due to the log link function. Hence, we use the incidence rate ratio (IRR) interpretation. (The 
significance levels remain roughly the same comparing the robust and the IRR – option). At the 
lower end of the distribution, IRR coefficients are significant for FractionSuccess in the range 
from zero to thirty. For example, the IRR at FractionSuccess20 = 0,592 (see column ‘FS20’) is 
the estimated rate ratio comparing whether the matched leader received the bonus, i.e., was 
successful, or not, while holding the message FractionSuccess at the level of 20%. Those whose 
matched leader was successful are expected to have an incidence rate for Puzzles 0,592 times 
that of subjects whose peer was not successful, which is a decrease of 41%. Thus, a low 
FractionSuccess is bad news, in particular if the matched leader has received the bonus; it seems 
to transport the message “I did it but it was so hard, you should not try it”. Low FractionSuccess 
of a matched leader who did not receive the bonus is in principle bad news as well, but much 
less so. The statement that only few reached a bonus does not seem highly credible if it comes 
from a person who did not manage to receive the bonus. Maybe subjects believe that their 
unsuccessful peer did not even try and only wants to justify her own behavior.  
The IRR-coefficients at the upper end are significant for FractionSuccess in the range from 70 
to 100 (with very high significance for 80-100). For instance, holding FractionSuccess at a high 
level of 80%, i.e., considering FractionSuccess80, the IRR coefficient is 1.786 (column 
‘FS80’): Those who receive the news that their matched leader has received the bonus are 
expected to have an incidence rate for Puzzles 1,786 times that of subjects that receive the 
opposite news, which corresponds to an increase of almost 79%. This is the good-news effect; 
it seems to transport the message “I could do it and I am similar to the average person, then so 
can you”. It seems encouraging to hear that many of the subjects are able to receive the bonus 
from a person who did it as well.  
EFFECTS ON BONUS and PAYOFF Turning to the outcome variables Bonus and Payoff, 
we observe that the significance levels for the different FractionSuccess values are very similar 
to Poisson estimates of the outcome variable Puzzles. Effects are significant at the upper and 
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the lower end of FractionSuccess with the same direction of the effect for each outcome 
variable. For instance, if the peer received a bonus and reported that only 20% were successful 
(i.e. at FractionSuccess20) the Payoff decreases by EUR 2.01. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the Payoff if one’s matched leader received a bonus and reported that 80% were successful 
increases by EUR 2.38, while the average payoff is EUR 15.73. Hence, there is a sizeable effect, 
not only on the number of puzzles solved and on the likelihood to receive a bonus, but also on 
the Payoff.  
ROBUSTNESS These results remain valid when we include variables from the questionnaire. 
As a test of robustness, we rerun the regressions including all variables from the questionnaire 
that survived the stepwise reduction procedures. The magnitude and significance levels are 
virtually the same.10   
As another test of robustness we exchange the variable for the message FractionSuccess with 
the binary variable Recommendation, which is one if the matched leader recommends to stay 
in the task and zero if she recommends to give up at some point. Table 5 reports the main 
outcome variables in dependence of whether the matched leader has recommended to give up 
or to stay in the task. The table gives an indication that recommendation to stay has generally a 
positive effect on outcome. This strongly indicates that it is indeed perseverance which is 
mainly required to succeed in the task. It also confirms the strong interaction between the 
content of the chat and the success of the peer. Recommendations of peers who received the 
bonus heavily affect outcome variables. In particular, the most encouraging leaders are those 
who have received the bonus and recommend to strive for the bonus. We have the binary 
variable for the recommendation which is either “stay in the task” or “quit at some point”.11 
Testing for significance (by a Fisher exact test and a Wilcoxon ranksum test) confirms: 
Recommendation to stay in the task leads to significant increase of Puzzles and a significant 
increase of the fraction of bonus reached, given that the matched leader has obtained the bonus 
(p<0.05).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The magnitudes are even a bit higher and the p-values are even a bit smaller when additional variables are 
included. These results can be requested from the authors.  
11 The coding of the chat for the recommendation entails three categories: “stay in the task”, “work first on the 
task and quit later”, and “quit immediately”. The binary variable recommendation simply distinguishes between 
the first and the two latter categories.  
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Figure 6: Recommendation from a peer who has reached the bonus positively affects both the number of 
correctly solved subtasks (Puzzles, left panel, p<0.05) and whether the bonus has been reached (Bonus, right 
panel, p<0.05).  
 
       
 
 
Summarizing we find both a good news effect and a bad news effect. Thereby, the signal about 
the peer’s performance alone is not sufficient since it is put in relation to what the peer 
communicates. Good news is obtained from a successful peer who communicates in an 
encouraging way. Bad news are obtained from a successful peer who communicates in 
discouraging ways.  
 
2.2.3 Effects of Being Observed by Peers  
We now compare the commitment treatment CL, in which subjects know that their performance 
will be shown to a peer and that they are going to chat with this peer, to the other treatments. 
Table 6 reports summary statistics of the variable Puzzles for CL and for all the other 
treatments.12 Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests reveal: Puzzles is 
significantly higher under CL than under both newcomer treatments, and significantly higher 
under CL than under all other treatments pooled. The effect of commitment on Puzzles is not 
so strong at the mean or the median as it is at the lower end of the distribution. While the null 
hypothesis is not rejected for CL vs. UCL (the uncommitted-leaders treatment) when using the 
rank-sum test (with p=0.2643), it is rejected when considering the fraction of participants who 
solved at least one, respectively at least two, puzzles. Fisher exact tests reveal that a fraction of 
subjects who solved at least one (or at least two) puzzles correctly is significantly higher under 
CL than under each of the three other treatments on the 5% significance level, as well as higher 
under CL than under all other treatments pooled, of course. Hence, subjects who know that their 
                                                 
12 For the newcomer treatments, we have seen that there are positive and negative effects, depending on the peer. 
These effects may well cancel each other out such that no treatment effects may be apparent when comparing the 
newcomer treatments with the UCL treatment.  
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result will be observed by a peer and that they have to justify themselves in a chat, tend to solve 
more puzzles on average and less often solve zero or only one puzzle.  
Figure 7: Fraction who solved at least one subtask, respectively at least two subtasks, is higher in the committed 
leader treatment than in the uncommitted leader treatment (Fisher exact tests: p<0.05). 
 
 
It seems that the fact that there will be an observer to whom the subject has to justify her 
performance motivates the participants to try the puzzles at least for a while. If subjects manage 
to solve five puzzles this behavior pays off with a bonus of 100 points. Otherwise, this is not so 
clear because at the same time the subjects could have earned points for surfing in the internet. 
In particular, subjects who solve two, three or four puzzles can neither accumulate much points 
in the surfing mode nor receive the bonus of 100 points. Correspondingly, we do not find that 
the commitment treatment significantly increases the likelihood of receiving the bonus (not 
reported here). In the commitment treatment the fraction is 36% and in the other treatments 
33%. Hence, it is not surprising that the difference of the commitment treatment CL to the other 
treatments in the number of puzzles solved does not materialize in higher payoffs. The average 
payoffs are 15.81 for CL and 15.70 EUR for all other treatments (these numbers are not repeated 
in the appendix).  
2.3 Summary of Experimental Results 
We find that knowing in advance that one has to justify one’s own perseverance toward one’s 
peers prevents giving up immediately but does not necessarily have long-lasting effects on 
perseverance. Hence, there seems to be a commitment effect as stipulated by the empirical 
literature on peer effects. However, we also find effects on those who observe how their 
advanced peers explain their own success or justify their own failure. More specifically, both 
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motivating and de-motivating messages from the advanced peer affect own perseverance if and 
only if the peer had been successful in her own task. A peer’s success or failure in itself, 
unmediated by communication, has no effect on perseverance. Our findings provide evidence 
both for the direction of causality assumed by the empirical literature on peer effects and the 
direction of causality suggested by BBT.  
 
3 Field Study 
By randomly matching peers in our lab experiment, we have assured that who interacts with 
whom is exogenous. In reality, however, people actively form (friendship) ties and hence the 
network is endogenous. Moreover, in the field we can study less artificial tasks that are 
economically more relevant. Hence, we did a field study that complements the lab experiment.13 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Individuals who achieve their goals are typically more self-controlled than those who set the 
same goals but fail to achieve them. We use this insight to implement a behavioral measure of 
self-control in our experiment. In theory, individuals learn from their experience and adjust 
their goal-setting behavior to their perceived level of self-control.14 Consequently, a behavioral 
measure of self-control can best be obtained from goal achievement at early stages of this 
learning process, i.e., from observing how well individuals not yet fully informed about their 
own self-control relate to their early goals. Hence, we (behaviorally) equate high self-control 
with a high level of early goal achievement.  
We are now in a position to formulate our first two hypotheses: 
 
H1 Performance increases in self-control, i.e., in early goal achievement. 
H2 Individuals with high self-control invest more effort into achieving their goals 
than individuals with low self-control. 
 
Our main question is how self-control interacts with one’s position in a social network and 
thereby with peer effects. BBT argue that only sufficiently self-controlled individuals profit 
from the interaction with peers; but they profit more from peers who are similar to them in 
                                                 
13 A more detailed description of this field study can be found in an earlier working paper version that was 
entitled “Peer Effects and Student’s Self-Control”. 
14 For a theory on learning self-control in a dynamic setting, see Ali (2011). 
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terms of self-control. This is because teaming up is helpful only if “good news” about the level 
of self-control of the other team members is sufficiently likely. Hence, if social network 
formation is endogenous and individuals link strategically (cf. Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), 
then the individuals with higher levels of prior self-control will choose to team up with each 
other whereas those with low levels of prior self-control will stay alone. Thus, two testable 
predictions of the BBT model are, first, that only sufficiently self-controlled individuals have a 
strictly positive number of links to others, and, second, that self-control is correlated among 
direct friends.  
The BBT model does not account for human capital. However, it is easy to see how an extended 
reasoning along its lines can be used to bridge the gap between the literature on self-control and 
the literature on how human capital of peers can affect achievement: Since self-controlled 
people tend to persist in their performance plans, they tend to acquire more human capital. 
Consequently, they become more valuable peers with regard to the peer effects on achievement 
that can be expected from them. If indeed only sufficiently self-controlled individuals connect 
with others, as the BBT model suggests, then only sufficiently self-controlled individuals will 
enjoy positive peer effects on their performance. Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
H3 Performance increases in the number of talented friends. 
H4 People with high self-control (a) are more likely to connect to others, (b) have 
a higher overall number of friends, and (c) have a higher number of talented 
friends. 
 
3.2 Study Design and Implementation 
3.2.1 Procedure 
We conducted our field study in a large undergraduate Microeconomics course at the University 
of Hamburg in the summer semester of 2013.15 In total, 117 first-year students regularly 
participated in the lecture and the tutorials.  
Our experiment was conducted in the following five waves: 
1. Survey on aspired course grades and current study time  
2. Survey on intermediate goals 
                                                 
15 In Hamburg, like in most German cities, courses in the summer semester are taught from beginning of April to 
mid July. 
21 
 
3. Measurement of intermediate goal achievement 
4. Elicitation of students’ social network  
5. Exam 
 
Students could not anticipate upcoming waves, and they were not told before the beginning of 
the fourth wave that they were part of a field study.16 Rather, they were told that some faculty 
wanted to analyze students' learning conditions and study behavior. Moreover, the 
experimenters who actually entered classes were not involved in teaching the lecture or tutorial 
courses.17 The teaching assistants were informed about who would enter their classes on which 
days and were told that the interventions they witnessed were part of a study on student 
behavior.18 They have never been informed about the fourth wave of the experiment or about 
the purpose of the first three waves before the end of the semester. Furthermore, they were 
instructed not to provide possible interpretations of our study to the students. Apparently 
students accepted our explanation of the interventions in their classes and never approached an 
experimenter or teaching assistant on this issue.  
THE FIRST WAVE  In the first wave, we conducted a survey in each tutorial, asking 
which grades students aspired to and how many minutes they on average studied per week for 
this specific course.  
THE SECOND WAVE The second wave was mainly dedicated to induce students to set 
goals for themselves at a relatively early stage of the course, since their behavior with respect 
to these goals allows us to measure students’ self-control at a later point in time. This wave was 
conducted in the tutorials. Each teaching assistant announced that some organizational issues 
were to be settled within the ongoing session of the tutorial course. Two intermediate goals 
were elicited.  
Intermediate goal with partial commitment A senior student who was not informed 
about the purpose or content of our study entered the tutorial course and truthfully explained to 
the students that they could enroll in a non-compulsory one-day micro workshop. Moreover, he 
mentioned that enrolment was not obligatory for participants but that each student who, though 
                                                 
16 We received consent of the department to conduct this study.  
17 The experimental team that actually entered the classes to conduct the experiment consisted of two of the three 
authors of this paper. The third author, Lydia Mechtenberg, committed both not to act as an experimenter in class 
and not to receive the data set in a non-anonymized form, since she was the lecturer of the Microeconomics course. 
Exams were graded by the teaching assistants who did not know the purpose of the study and never received access 
to the data set.  
18 In the second wave, they announced the modalities of handing in the mid-term problem set as a natural part of 
their teaching job. These modalities were designed for experimental purposes about which, however, the teaching 
assistants were not informed. 
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enrolled, would not show up for the workshop would have to pay a fee of 3 EUR. By contrast, 
participation, both with and without enrolment, was free of charge. It was also made clear that 
payment of the fee would be asserted.19 Hence, students were offered a pre-designed goal 
(participating in the workshop) together with a commitment device (the fee). Then, the senior 
student distributed enrolment forms that again mentioned the fee and provided the link to a 
website where online enrolment for the workshop was possible. Finally, he collected the 
enrolment forms and left the class. 
Intermediate goal without commitment The teaching assistant truthfully explained to his 
students that they had to submit a compulsory midterm assignment in order to be eligible for 
the final exam. This assignment – a standard problem set – was identical for all students. The 
quality of the solution was not decisive for students’ admission to the final exam; but their 
solution had to fulfill the minimum requirement of being a recognizable attempt to solve all 
problems of the problem set. The teaching assistant explained to his students that they had to 
choose between two submission deadlines, an early and a late one, which were neutrally framed. 
He distributed forms on which the two deadlines were specified and the students were asked to 
individually choose their preferred deadline. Hence, students were offered the possibility of 
regulating their own future learning behavior by choosing the goal of submitting early. Students 
were told that their choice was not binding but helpful for organizational purposes. They were 
also told that assignments handed in after the late deadline would not be considered and 
excluded the students from the possibility of taking the exam. This information was provided 
online, too, and was repeated several times in the lecture to make sure that all students enrolled 
would understand it. To provide a (weak) incentive for students to choose the early deadline, a 
weakly informative online feedback about the quality of their solution of the midterm 
assignment was promised to students who submitted prior to the early deadline. However, we 
instructed the teaching assistants not to provide the correct solutions of the midterm 
assignments in their online feedback. No feedback was provided to students who submitted 
prior to the late but after the early deadline. However, any student always – also after the early 
deadline – had the opportunity to approach their teaching assistant after the tutorials or during 
the office hours to get any information about any exercise they needed help with.  
THE THIRD WAVE The organizing team of the workshop collected the data about 
students’ enrolments and their actual participation and passed them on to the experimental team. 
The workshop took place on a weekend day after the third wave of the experiment. In its course, 
                                                 
19In fact, teaching assistants and the experimental team collected the fee within the three weeks after the workshop 
and, if necessary, immediately after the exam. 
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additional exercises related to the content of the micro course and prepared by the organizing 
team were discussed. The teaching assistants collected all data about students’ choices of a 
submission deadline and registered whether students’ actually submitted before the chosen 
deadline. Again, all data were passed on to the experimental team.  
THE FOURTH WAVE The main purpose of the fourth wave was to elicit students’ 
networks. We conducted a final survey in which students were asked to name the peers with 
whom they had joined to prepare themselves for the exam (outside the official lectures and 
tutorials). These lists of names allow us to reconstruct the social network of learning 
relationships within class.20 For each of the listed friends some further survey questions 
specified the kind of relationship, e.g., since when they know each other. We also asked how 
they perceived their own, their peers’, and other students’ degree of self-control.21  
THE FIFTH WAVE Students wrote the final exam either at the beginning or at the end 
of the semester break. Thereby, they could score between 0 and 90 points.22  
3.2.2  Key Measures  
MEASURING PERFORMANCE, TALENT AND EFFORT We use the score in the final 
exam to measure performance, since it fully determines the overall course grades. We also 
obtained the scores (and grades) from a previous math course as a control variable for talent 
since a proficiency in math was important both for solving the preparatory problem sets and for 
doing well in the exam.  
MEASURING SELF-CONTROL We constructed an indicator variable, self control, that 
measures whether a student behaved in a time-consistent way, i.e., achieved her own 
intermediate goals. A student’s two intermediate goals are to submit the midterm assignment 
prior to the deadline that she herself had previously chosen and to participate in the workshop 
in case that she had registered for participation. Among the 63 students who signed up for the 
micro workshop, a share of 73% (46 students) attended it. Early midterm assignment was 
planned by 107 students, but only a share of 73% (78 students) actually delivered early. The 
binary variable self control becomes one if the student both submitted prior to her self-chosen 
deadline and did not fail to attend the workshop if enrolled. This variable captures self-control 
                                                 
20 Literally, the social network is directed because some students are mentioned by others who do not mention 
them. However, it seems more reasonable to consider learning relations as bilateral and to believe that two students 
have learned together even if only one of them reports this, e.g., because the other learning partner was absent on 
the day on which we conducted the final survey. We use the two direct networks to test for robustness of the 
results.  
21 Students reported their perceived degree of self-control on a scale between 0 and 10. 
22 Students who failed to pass at the early date were automatically eligible to write a new version of the exam at 
the end of the semester break. 
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since it assigns low self-control to students who cannot resist the temptation to procrastinate 
when preparing the midterm assignment or the temptation to spend their week-end in a more 
agreeable way than by attending a workshop that they had planned to attend.23 The basic 
assumption underlying the construction of the indicator variable is that, as implied by economic 
theory, the economic concept of self-control can be equated with time-consistent behavior. An 
important alternative interpretation would be that self control captures an advantage in human 
capital of those students who attended the workshop and received feedback after an early 
submission of their midterm assignment. To test whether this is true, we conducted a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test comparing the performance of those who attended the workshop and received the 
feedback with those who did not. The result is displayed in Table 9. There is no evidence that 
workshop attendance and feedback affected performance. Hence, we can be confident that self 
control measures time inconsistency only. 
MEASURING STUDENTS’ SOCIAL NETWORK POSITION We created two 
different variables: friends and degree. The binary variable friends takes the value one if the 
student is at all connected to others, i.e., is part of a study group, and zero otherwise. The 
variable degree counts the student’s direct links to others, i.e. the number of learning partners.24 
We computed both variables from the undirected social network. In order to check for 
robustness of our results we also use variables derived from the directed network. 
DIFFERENTIATION OF PEERS   To further substantiate friends’ peer effects we 
categorize them as talented or untalented according to their math score. The count variable 
talented friends counts the number of links to fellow students who have a math score weakly 
above 58 points, while the count variable untalented friends counts the number of links to fellow 
students who have a math score weakly below 55 points. The chosen threshold makes use of 
the fact that no student achieved a math score between 55 and 58; and it splits all friends in two 
categories of equal size.  
Descriptive statistics of our most important variables are provided in Table 7. 
                                                 
23 In principle, we can also construct two separate indicator variables for time-consistent behavior concerning each 
of the two intermediate goals. While many of our results are qualitatively unaffected, there is simply less variation 
in these two measures. 
24 Further network statistics, such as measures of centrality, are difficult to interpret since the network is quite 
sparse, consisting of many isolates and small components. 
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3.3 Main Results 
3.3.1 Determinants of Performance 
Table 8 displays the results on how individual characteristics, including self-control, general 
connectedness to other students and specific connectedness to highly talented students affect 
performance. In all models, we tested for the presence of omitted variables with a specification-
error test as well as for multicollinearity and rejected both. Moreover, ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimates were calculated with robust standard errors. We additionally used a two-step 
FGLS (feasible generalized least square) method to account for heteroskedasticity and thus to 
gain efficiency. 
SELF-CONTROL AND TALENT Both individual self-control and talent have a 
positive effect on performance. Pairwise correlation of the dependent variable and these 
regressor variables yields a correlation coefficient of 0.66 (with a p-value smaller than 0.001) 
for talent and performance, while the correlation coefficient of self-control and performance is 
0.30 (with a p-value of 0.003). The effect of talent is significant at the 1% level across all model 
specifications. Self-control is statistically significant, albeit to a lesser degree. Being highly 
self-controlled is associated roughly with an eight points higher micro score, which is 
substantial since the maximal score is 90 and the median score is 58. The standard deviation of 
math score, our control variable for talent, is 21 (reported in Table 7); an increase of one 
standard deviation in math score leads to a rise of 12 points in the micro score. These results 
fully support our hypothesis H1 that self-control positively affects performance.  
SELF-CONTROL AND PEER EFFECTS The number of friends in general, 
measured by degree, has no significant effect on performance when controlling for talent and 
self-control (see columns 2 and 3 in Table 8). However, increasing the number of talented 
friends, i.e., friends with a high math score, significantly improves performance, which is fully 
in line with our hypothesis H3. If we control for the number of talented friends, the effect of 
self-control becomes weaker. Within the OLS regression the effect of self-control is of the same 
dimension but insignificant. In the FGLS model, the effect of self-control remains significant 
when controlling for the number of talented friends. Since overall model diagnostic statistics 
favor the FGLS model, we conclude that both self-control and being connected to many talented 
peers significantly improve performance. Overall, we find strong evidence in support of our 
hypotheses H1 and H3. 
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3.3.2 The Interaction of Self-Control and Peer Effects 
SELF-CONTROL AND STUDENTS’ SOCIAL NETWORK  Figure 1 displays the 
social network of our students and provides a first impression of the relationship between self-
control and connectedness. Importantly, most students who have at least one friend also have a 
high level of self-control, whereas the majority of those who are unconnected to any friends 
also exhibit low self-control. To be more precise, only 39% of the many isolates have a high 
level of self-control. In contrast, 71% of the students who have at least one friend also exhibit 
high self-control. This observation already suggests that network formation among students 
could well be fully in line with the BBT model, i.e., that only sufficiently self-controlled 
individuals profit from teaming up with similarly self-controlled peers.  
 
 
Figure 8: Students’ learning network and their self-control. Light-green (dark-red) stands for a high (low) level 
of self-control. Circle (box) indicates a female (male) student. 
 
 
To test this hypothesis we first consider the variable friends, i.e., the binary variable measuring 
whether a student is connected to any friends at all (friends = 1). Indeed, students with high 
self-control are much more likely to have connections to peers (Pearson Chi2 = 12.159 with p-
value < 0.001 and Fisher’s exact test yields p-value = 0.001).25 To control for other individual 
characteristics, we run a probit regression with friends as a dependent variable, using self-
control and further individual characteristics as covariates. A Hosmer-Lemeshow specification 
                                                 
25 This result is not reported in the tables. 
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test shows that all the models are well specified. Table 11 displays the results. Self-control and 
talent both have a statistically significant positive impact on the likelihood of being connected 
in different model specifications. Indeed, the predicted probability of being connected is 21% 
higher for individuals with high self-control than for those with low self-control, holding all 
other covariates constant.  
We also tested whether self-control tends to increase the number of friends a student is 
connected to. Since the dependent variable degree, the number of friends, is a nonnegative 
integer, we use Poisson and negative binomial models. Results are shown in Table 11. Since 
overdispersion is present, negative binomial models provide the best fit. Our results support our 
findings from the previous binary outcome model. Highly self-controlled students have a higher 
number of friends; and this effect is significant at the 5% level in both models. Specifically, a 
discrete change from having low self-control to having high self-control is associated with 0.64 
additional friends. To check for robustness, we use the directed network and estimate the effect 
of self-control on outdegree and indegree, i.e. the number of friends a student nominated in the 
survey, respectively how often the student was nominated. Both measures from the directed 
network show a significant effect of similar size.26 Overall, our estimates consistently show that 
highly self-controlled students are more likely to have friends and also tend to have more friends 
than students with low self-control. This is clear evidence for parts (a) and (b) of our hypothesis 
H4. 
To test whether highly self-controlled students are also more likely to have highly talented 
friends, we ran two Poisson regressions with talented friends and untalented friends as response 
variables. Since the equidispersion property is not violated, models fitting the Poisson 
distribution are used. Results are reported in column 1 of Table 12. On average, the number of 
highly talented friends is increasing in self-control. This effect is positive and statistically 
significant, which supports part (c) of our hypothesis H4. The size of the effect is also 
substantial: Being highly self-controlled is associated with 0.35 additional talented friends. 
We also tested whether self-control affects the number of lowly talented friends, i.e., the number 
of friends with a low math score. As can be seen from the second column of Table 12, we do 
not find any effect of self-control on the number of lowly talented friends. Hence, while a highly 
self-controlled student is more likely than a student with low self-control to have friends at all, 
the former also seems to be more selective in choosing her friends than the latter. Since students 
with more talented friends perform better in the exam, these results imply that self-control 
facilitates positive peer effects on performance: More self-controlled students have better 
                                                 
26 These results are not reported in the tables.  
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access to highly talented peers and thereby accomplish more than their less well-connected 
peers. This is another channel through which self-control affects performance. Overall, we 
conclude that there is supportive evidence for all parts of our hypothesis H4 showing a strong 
link between a student’s connectedness and her self-control. By contrast, we do not find any 
evidence in favor of our hypothesis H5, i.e., that self-control is correlated among direct friends. 
This, however, seems due to the fact that testing this hypothesis requires a dramatic reduction 
in sample size since a significant part of our students does not have any friends at all. Hence, 
we conclude that our results are sufficiently in line with the BBT model to provide support for 
it.27  
3.3.3 Gender Differences in Self-Control and Peer Effects 
Since we conducted our field study in an educational setting where gender differences typically 
play an important role, we also investigate whether and how female students differ from male 
students in self-control, peer effects and performance. 
Table 13 and Figure 9 display the results regarding self-control. Female students are 
significantly more self-controlled than their male counterparts: females’ likelihood of being 
highly self-controlled is 38% higher than males’, holding other covariates constant. Moreover, 
comparing the probabilities of being highly self-controlled between female and male students 
for different levels of talent, as we do in Figure 9, reveals, first, that the predicted values of 
being highly self-controlled are higher for female students for all levels of talent. Second, men’s 
fitted probability of being highly self-controlled increases much more strongly in talent than 
women’s, i.e. the men’s slope is steeper. One possible explanation could be that women partly 
use self-control as a substitute for talent while men’s self-control and talent are complements. 
To test whether this notable advantage over their male peers gives female students a head-start 
in the exam, we conducted a Wilcoxon rank-sum test which is displayed in Table 9. Moreover, 
we controlled for gender when examining determinants of students’ performance (see all model 
specifications in Table 8). As can be seen from both tables, our findings do not indicate that 
women outperform men. If anything, men perform better than women. Hence, we conclude that 
the advantage of female students in terms of self-control must be counterbalanced by some 
disadvantage either in other determinants of performance or in the way in which self-control is 
used to increase performance. A second Wilcoxon rank-sum test which is displayed in Table 9 
                                                 
27 Note that a very specific prediction of the BBT model is the claim that only sufficiently self-controlled 
individuals profit from connecting to others at all. This prediction could not be generated by a theory of homophile 
network formation, other than the prediction that self-control be correlated among friends. Hence, since we validate 
the former claim, we provide evidence in support of the BBT model.  
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reveals that women seem to scribe somewhat lower math scores than men, but this is not 
significant. Hence, we cannot conclude that women have a disadvantage in talent. Regarding 
their social network, neither are female students significantly less likely to have friends, nor do 
numbers of friends differ significantly between the sexes, as can be seen from Table 10 and 
Table 11. This is already an interesting observation, since one could expect the (more self-
controlled) female students to be more likely than the male students to be connected to friends 
at all, given that self-control turned out to be an important determinant of connectedness. 
However, if we look deeper into the way in which female and male students form their social 
network, an interesting gender difference emerges that possibly counteracts the women’s 
advantage in self-control: We find a compositional difference in how female and male students 
form their network. Female students seem less selective than male students in choosing their 
friends since there is a strong negative impact of being female on the number of talented friends 
which is significant at the 1% level (cf. Table 12). In particular, female students have 0.4 fewer 
highly talented friends compared to male students.  
Hence, female students, although more self-controlled on average than male students, seem to 
use their self-control less efficiently to get access to highly talented peers and hence profit less 
from positive peer effects on performance.28 
3.4 Summary of Field Study Results 
In the field study, our main contribution is to show that there exists a significant and sizable 
relation between connectedness to peers and self-controlled behavior. More self-controlled 
students are more likely to be connected and tend to have both more friends in total and more 
highly talented friends than their less self-controlled counterparts. Moreover, the connection to 
highly talented peers is an additional channel through which self-control positively affects 
performance. We also find gender differences: Female students are more self-controlled than 
their male counterparts, but do not outperform the latter although they seem to be equally 
talented. Our main finding of a positive relation between connectedness to peers and self-
controlled behavior is in line with the theory provided by BBT.  
                                                 
28 This finding seems to be very much in line with the empirical results of Lalanne and Seabright (2013) and the 
experimental findings of Friebel et al. (2013). Lalanne and Seabright (2013) find that the presence of influential 
individuals in a cohort of employees improves men’s wages much more strongly than women’s. Friebel et al. find 
that men’s network formation is more reactive to short-term benefits (i.e., payoffs) than women’s. Obviously, there 
are other possible explanations, for example that women perform worse than equally talented men in competitive 
environments (see, e.g., Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), Niederle and Vesterlund, (2007), and Jurajda and 
Münich (2011)). 
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4 Discussion and Conclusion 
In our lab experiment, we investigated the two causal channels through which peers might 
influence individual perseverance. One channel (“being observed by peers”) is stipulated by the 
empirical literature on peer effects, the other channel (“observing peers”) is stipulated in a 
theoretical model of self-control (BBT). Importantly, our findings on the interaction of 
communication and observed success corroborate the approach of BBT who argue that some 
assumed similarity between one’s own self-control and the self-control of one’s peers is 
necessary for one’s own perseverance to be affected by the peer’s success or failure. In our lab 
experiment, such beliefs are formed through communication when the advanced peers express 
their beliefs about how widespread their own success or failure may be among the experimental 
subjects (and, thus, how similar they believe themselves to be to the average student). Our 
results confirm the prediction of BBT that a peer’s success enhances own perseverance the 
more, the more likely it is that her type – i.e., her inner resource of self-control – is similar to 
one’s own: Only successful peers who expressed the belief that more than half of the 
experimental subjects were successful, too, had a significant stimulating effect on the 
perseverance of the subjects matched with them. Intuitively, their success could be interpreted 
as the message “Since I am an average person, and I did it, you can do it, too”. However, our 
experiment also shows that, unpredicted by BBT, subjects can be affected negatively by their 
peer’s success if they are told that their peer believes herself to be the exception rather than the 
rule. In this case, BBT would predict no effect rather than a negative effect. Psychologically, 
we believe our finding to be intuitive: The success of an – according to herself – exceptionally 
self-controlled peer may be interpreted as the message “I did it, but since I am an exceptional 
person, you do not even have to try”. Hence, our experiment is a first step to bridge the gap 
between BBT and the literature on how communication affects self-confidence. It confirms the 
important role that Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2003) ascribe to the way advanced peers 
communicate with beginners whose self-confidence is still under formation; and it shows that 
– and how – one and the same fact (the success of an advanced peer) can be turned into a 
motivating or a de-motivating message.  
Surprisingly, we find that a peer’s failure, even if justified by this peer herself as likely to be 
widespread among the experimental subjects, has no significant effect on own perseverance. At 
first glance, this seems contrary to BBT, too, who would predict a negative effect. However, 
BBT assume objective public information about the similarity between self-control levels 
among peers whereas we, in our lab experiment, implement subjective private information 
(through peer-to-peer communication) about such similarities. Hence, it seems that in our lab 
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experiment, only successful peers are taken to be credible in their communication about how 
similar they believe themselves to be to the average person. Therefore, the results of our lab 
experiment can be used to test the predictions of BBT about the effects of successful (highly 
self-controlled) peers on own perseverance but may reveal nothing regarding BBT’s  
predictions about the effects of unsuccessful peers.  
BBT assume that network formation is guided by rationality, i.e., peers connect to each other if 
getting “good news” from these peers is sufficiently likely and getting “bad news” sufficiently 
unlikely. One consequence of this assumption is that individuals of very low self-control tend 
to be unconnected, and that individuals of high self-control connect to each other. The main 
result of our field study is consistent with this prediction. However, one possible alternative 
interpretation of the higher connectedness among self-controlled students would be that 
students’ social network (which might be exogenous to some extent) affects the degree to which 
students behave in a self-controlled manner. For instance, having friends with whom study 
activities are coordinated might serve as a commitment device that helps students to exhibit 
self-controlled behavior. In our lab experiment, we also found evidence for such a commitment 
effect. Hence, we conclude that both channels of causality can be active; they might even 
complement each other and lead to a virtuous circle between self-control and positive peer 
effects. 
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Appendix: Tables
A Tables of Lab Experiment
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Lab Experiment
variable N mean sd min max p50 mean if stayed mean if given up
(N=157) (N=178)
Puzzles 335 3.37 2.52 0 10 4 5.15 1.80
Bonus 335 0.34 0.47 0 1 0 0.73 0.00
MinutesTask 335 39.55 14.73 0.05 49.98 49.55 49.98 30.34
Payoff 335 15.73 3.19 8.10 23.50 15.20 17.12 14.5
Notes: Calculation is based on data from laboratory experiment conducted in 2015. The variable Puzzles is a count
variable capturing the number of subtasks solved correctly. The variable Bonus is binary and equal to 1 if the
bonus was reached; zero otherwise. The variable MinutesTask captures the time elapsed until the “terminate task”
button is pushed. When it is never pushed, then MinutesTask is fifty, which is measured by the computer as 49.98.
Variable Payoff captures the experimental payout in EUR. “Given up” means that the “terminate task” button is
pushed at some point, “stayed” means that it was never pushed.
Table 2: MinutesTask by Puzzles if Given Up
Puzzles 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
Mean 17.29 27.83 36.88 43.74 43.91 45.01 41.66 46.41 46.90 30.34
Std. Dev. 12.05 10.91 10.68 7.21 7.31 4.38 5.09 0.11 4.03 15.08
Freq. 63 36 24 19 15 12 5 2 2 178
Rounds 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
Mean 17.29 27.83 36.88 43.74 43.91 45.01 41.66 46.41 46.9 30.34
Notes: The variable MinutesTask captures the time elapsed until the “terminate task” button is pushed.
This table only reports the observations in which this button was pushed at some point (“Given Up”).
Puzzles is a count variable capturing the number of subtasks solved correctly.
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Table 3: Basic Regressions
(1) (1’) (2) (2’) (3)
Poisson IRR Logit Odd Ratios OLS
Puzzles Puzzles Bonus Bonus Payoff
BonusPeer -0.892* 0.410*** -2.956** 0.052** -3.586**
(0.476) 0.125 (1.358) 0.071 (1.455)
FractionSuccess -0.006 0.994 -0.018 0.982 -0.025
(0.005) 0.004 (0.013) 0.014 (0.018)
FractionSuccess x BP 0.018** 1.019*** 0.064*** 1.066*** 0.075***
(0.008) 0.006 (0.024) 0.026 (0.027)
constant 1.294*** -0.444 16.367***
(0.157) (0.443) (0.657)
N 110 110 110 110 110
χ2 6.282 11.594 7.566 8.869
P 0.099 0.009 0.056 0.031 0.060
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.021 0.065 0.065
F 2.543
R2 0.058
Notes: Dependent variables are Puzzles in models (1) and (1’), Bonus in models (2) and (2’), and
Payoff in model (3). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variable FractionSuccess is
the fraction of participants who receive the bonus as estimated by the matched peer of the observed
subject. The variable BonusPeer is equal to 1 if the matched peer has received the bonus and zero
otherwise. “FractionSuccess x BP” stands for the interaction term between FractionSuccess and
BonusPeer. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 4: Effect of BonusPeer at Different Levels of FractionSuccess
FS0 FS10 FS20 FS30 FS40 FS50 FS60 FS70 FS80 FS90 FS100
Puzzles
Poiss. IRR 0.410*** 0.493*** 0.592** 0.712* 0.856 1.028 1.236 1.486** 1.786** 2.147*** 2.581***
0.125 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.132 0.153 0.201 0.286 0.414 0.594 0.838
Bonus
Logit OR 0.052** 0.098** 0.186* 0.353 0.668 1.263 2.391 4.524* 8.561** 16.202** 30.661**
0.071 0.114 0.178 0.277 0.441 0.777 1.586 3.565 8.22 18.772 42.07
Payoff
OLS -3.586** -2.841** -2.095** -1.35 -0.605 0.14 0.885 1.631* 2.376** 3.121** 3.866**
(1.455) (1.223) (1.011) (0.836) (0.724) (0.707) (0.79) (0.947) (1.149) (1.375) (1.616)
Notes: Dependent variables are Puzzles in the first row, Bonus in the second row, and Payoff the third row. The
columns stand for the effect of the bonus of the matched peer when her estimated fraction of subjects who reach the
bonus is 0, 10,..., 100. As detailed in the main text, we obtain these effects by using the variable FractionSuccessk, which
is defined as FractionSuccess minus constant k, and considering the coefficient for BonusPeer. The coefficients in the
first row report the incident rate ratios (IRR) of the Poisson regressions that correspond to model (1’) in Table 3. The
coefficients in the second row report the odd ratios of the logit regressions that correspond to model (2’) in Table 3. The
coefficients in the third row report the marginal effects of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that correspond
to model (3) in Table 3. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level.
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Table 5: Outcome Variables by Recommendation and Bonus of the Matched Peer
Bonus of Peer Any No Bonus Bonus
Recommendation by Peer Give Up Stay Give Up Stay Give Up Stay
N 68 53 56 16 12 37
Puzzles 2.81 3.47 2.94 3.04 1.75 3.7
Bonus 26.47% 37.74% 30.36% 31.25% 8.33% 40.54%
Notes: Means of outcome variables Puzzles and Bonus. Columns distinguish cases by whether the matched
peer has reached the bonus and by the peer’s recommendation. The coding of the chat for the recommendation
entails three categories: “stay in the task”, “work first on the task and quit later”, and “quit immediately”. The
binary variable Recommendation simply distinguishes between the first (“Stay”) and the two latter categories
(“Give Up”).
Table 6: Puzzles by Commitment
Puzzles N mean Sd p50 Frac >0 Frac >1
“committed leaders” (CL) 84 3.83 2.37 4 90.5% 81.0%
Others (UCL, NewCL, NewUCL) 251 3.22 2.56 3 76.9% 63.8%
“uncommitted leaders” (UCL) 84 3.38 2.54 4 77.4% 67.9%
“newcomers with committed leaders” (NewCL) 83 3.13 2.54 3 79.5% 63.9%
“newcomers with committed leaders” (NewUCL) 84 3.13 2.62 4 73.8% 59.5%
Total 335 3.37 2.52 4 80.3% 68.1%
Notes: The variable Puzzles captures the number of substasks solved correctly. The columns “Frac > 0” and “Frac
> 1” report the fraction of observations that solved more than zero, respectively more than one, subtasks correctly.
Rows distinguish observations by treatments.
3
B Tables of Field Study
Table 7: Summary Statistics of Field Study
Variable # of obs. # of obs. if var =1 Mean Std. dev. p50 Min Max
micro score (performance) 96 - 56.59 20.70 58 0 88
math score (talent) 100 - 48.19 20.80 51 0 82
self control (1=yes) 117 63 0.54 0.50 1 0 1
gender (1=female) 117 52 0.44 0.50 0 0 1
friends (1= at least one friend) 117 55 0.47 0.50 0 0 1
degree 117 23 0.94 1.33 0 0 7
Notes: Calculation based on data collected in spring and summer 2013. Sample includes first year economics students. Variables
micro score, math score and effort are metric. The construction of self control is described in detail in section 3.2. The variable
gender is binary and 44% of the students are female. The variable friends is binary as well. 55 students reported to have
studied with at least one friend for the micro course. The count variable degree gives the number of friends a student has.
Table 8: Self control, Talented Peers and Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS FGLS OLS FGLS
micro score micro score micro score micro score micro score
self control (1=yes) 8.896* 8.553* 7.974** 7.125 6.831*
(4.737) (4.932) (3.734) (4.854) (3.760)
math score 0.580*** 0.579*** 0.578*** 0.580*** 0.580***
(0.110) (0.111) (0.086) (0.105) (0.084)
gender (1=female) -4.251 -4.008 -4.089 -2.111 -2.230
(4.413) (4.484) (3.300) (4.426) (3.376)
degree 0.574 1.097
(1.194) (1.126)
talented friends 4.340** 4.067**
(1.938) (1.962)
constant 23.805*** 23.300*** 23.142*** 21.807*** 22.188***
(6.385) (6.471) (5.489) (6.225) (5.337)
Observations 88 88 88 88 88
adj. R2 0.422 0.417 0.436 0.441 0.460
F-statistic 22.743 17.276 17.836 18.837 19.540
p value F-statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Dependent variable is the score obtained in Introductory Microeconomics exam. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Feasible
generalized least square (FGLS) is calculated with a skedasticity function that includes math score and self
control.
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Table 9: Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) Tests
performance by gender observations rank sum expected
male 55 2915.5 2667.5
female 41 1740.5 1988.5
combined 96 4656 4656
z value 1.838
p value of z 0.0661
talent by gender
male 61 3310.5 3080.5
female 39 1739.5 1969.5
combined 100 5050 5050
z value 1.626
p value of z 0.1040
performance by early submission and workshop attendance
yes (both criteria fulfilled) 31 1980 1829
no (only one or none criterion fulfilled) 86 4923 5074
combined 117 6903 6903
z value -0.933
p value of z 0.3509
Notes: Performance is measured as the score obtained in Introductory Microeconomics exam. Talent is measured
as the score obtained in the Math exam. Results on performance and talent indicate, if anything, higher levels for
men. There is no difference in performance with regard to workshop attendance and early submission of midterm
assignment.
Table 11: Self-Control on General Connectedness
(1) (2) (3)
poisson negative binomial negative binomial
degree degree degree
math score 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
gender (1=female) -0.286 -0.318 -0.318
(0.264) (0.279) (0.272)
self control (1=yes) 0.627** 0.641** 0.641**
(0.271) (0.296) (0.270)
constant -0.539 -0.517 -0.517
(0.561) (0.366) (0.589)
(0.395) (0.409) (0.491)
ηsc 0.639**
(0.255)
Observations 100 100 100
Wald-statistic 8.307 8.209 9.036
p value Wald-statistic 0.040 0.042 0.029
dispersion parameter α 0.526
p value α 0.0014
loglikelihood -143.9276 -138.8002 -138.8002
AIC 295.8553 287.6004 287.6004
BIC 306.2760 300.6263 300.6263
Notes: Dependent count variable degree is defined as number of friends. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses for the first and third model. The second model was calculated without robust
standard errors to retrieve the dispersion parameter α. Overdispersion is present. ηsc: average
marginal effect of degree with respect to self control. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
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Table 10: Self-Control on General Connectedness
(1) (2) (3)
probit probit probit
friends (1=yes) friends (1=yes) friends (1=yes)
math score 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.018*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
gender (1=female) -0.077 0.081 -0.333
(0.310) (0.535) (0.728)
self control (1=yes) 0.593* 0.673* 0.602**
(0.303) (0.357) (0.306)
gender x self control -0.243
(0.632)
gender x talent 0.005
(0.014)
constant -1.143*** -1.173*** -1.038**
(0.395) (0.409) (0.491)
ηmath 0.0067***
(0.002)
ηsc 0.215**
(0.109)
Observations 100 100 100
pseudo R2 0.131 0.132 0.132
F-statistic 15.368 15.429 15.893
p value F-statistic 0.0015 0.0039 0.0032
loglikelihood -59.9514 -59.8717 -59.8730
AIC 127.9028 129.7434 129.7459
BIC 138.3235 142.7692 142.7718
Notes: Dependent variable friends is binary and equal to 1 if the student named at least one
learning partner; zero otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ηmath/ ηsc: average
marginal effect of friends w.r.t. math score/ self control. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 12: Self-Control and (Un-)talented friends
(1) (2)
poisson poisson
talented friends untalented friends
math score 0.005 0.007
(0.008) (0.011)
gender (1=female) -0.941*** 0.131
(0.337) (0.357)
self control (1=yes) 0.864** 0.341
(0.360) (0.346)
constant -1.279** -1.272
(0.550) (0.775)
ηgender -0.391***
(0.136)
ηsc 0.375***
(0.141)
Observations 100 100
Wald-statistic 15.911 1.547
p value Wald-statistic 0.001 0.671
loglikelihood -85.142 -99.701
AIC 178.284 207.403
BIC 188.704 217.823
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of (un-)talented friends and is a
count variable. Talented friends are friends that have a math score weakly
above the median of the cohort, untalented friends have a math score below
the median of the cohort. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Overdis-
persion is not present and both models are fitted using Poisson distribution.
ηgender / ηsc: average marginal effect of dependent variables w.r.t. gender
and self control. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 13: Gender and Self-Control
(1) (2) (3)
probit probit probit
self control (1=yes) self control (1=yes) self control (1=yes)
math score 0.024*** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.010)
gender (1=female) 0.623*** 1.154*** 1.397*
(0.240) (0.320) (0.796)
gender x talent -0.006
(0.017)
constant -0.174 -1.391*** -1.498***
(0.157) (0.461) (0.571)
ηmath 0.0078***
(0.002)
ηgender 0.375***
(0.085)
Observations 117 100 100
F-statistic 6.754 15.663 16.439
p value F-statistic 0.0094 0.0004 0.0009
loglikelihood -77.2923 -56.3700 -56.2932
AIC 158.5847 118.7400 120.5863
BIC 164.1090 126.5555 131.0070
Notes: Dependent variable self control is binary and equal to 1 if the student behaved in a time
consistent manner concerning early goal achievement; zero otherwise. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. ηmath/ ηgender: average
marginal effect of self control w.r.t. math score and gender.
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Figure 9: Self-control by Gender
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by selecting into groups that help them reach their goals.
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